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Gratian and the Jews
Kenneth Pennington

Since Anders Winroth and Carlos Larrainzar discovered earlier
versions of Gratian’s Decretum, legal historians have explored
these manuscripts for evidence that they hoped would reveal how
Gratian’s changes and additions to his text could provide insights
into how his thought and ideas developed.1 Although there is
still a vigorous debate about exactly how the manuscript tradition
reflects the evolution of his Decretum, we know far more about
Gratian now than we did before. Not everyone agrees on what
we know. I think that Gratian began teaching in the 1120s, that
the Saint Gall manuscript 673 is the earliest witness to his
teaching, and that the other manuscripts discovered by Winroth
and Larrainzar provide evidence that a version of his Decretum
circulated widely in the 1130s. The final version of his
Decretum ca. 1140 was compiled by gradually adding canons to
various parts of the text over an extended period of time.2 That is
an outline of what I think we know.

Anders Winroth’s book, The Making of Gratian’s Decretum (Cambridge
2000), was responsible for opening wonderful new vistas for understanding
the development of the Decretum. On the St. Gall manuscript see Carlos
Larrainzar’s essays, ‘El borrador del la ‘Concordia’ de Graziano: Sankt
Gallen, Stiftsbibliothek MS 673 (=Sg)’, 9 (1999) Ius ecclesiae: Rivista
internazionale di diritto canonico 593-666 and ’El decreto de Graciano del
códice Fd (=Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conventi Soppressi
A.I.402): In memoriam Rudolf Weigand’, Ius ecclesiae: Rivista
internazionale di diritto canonico 10 (1998) 421-489. I will limit my citations
to the rather large literature that has been published since 1998. Almost all the
relevant essays touching upon the issues that I mention in my first paragraphs
are dealt with in essays printed in the BMCL between 1998 and 2013 and the
ZRG, Kan. Abt. during the same period.
See especially Melodie H.
Eichbauer,
‘Gratian’s Decretum and the Changing Historiographical
Landscape’, History Compass 11/12 (2013): 1111-1125.
2
Melodie H. Eichbauer, ‘From the First to the Second Recension: The
Progressive Evolution of the Decretum’, BMCL 29 (2011-2012) 119-167.
1
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The value of the Saint Gall manuscript is particularly
controverted.3 In my opinion no one has been able to prove
conclusively that it is an abbreviation — or the contrary. The
winnowing and sifting of the evidence proceeds apace. The
status of Saint Gall is primarily important for understanding how
Gratian began to teach canon law. My conviction that it
represents how Gratian first began to teach canon law in the
1120’s cannot be proven conclusively now and probably never
will be unless we find other manuscript evidence. Still, the
format of the manuscript contains a powerful clue. It only
contains the causae. They were Gratian’s remarkable contribution to twelfth-century education. He invented a system of
teaching law that depended on introducing his students to
hypothetical cases based on legal problems that could have easily
been heard in the courts during the first half of the twelfth
century. In addition Gratian employed the dialectical methodlogy created by the masters in northern France to legal problems.
I think the great success of the Decretum and its immediate and
enthusiastic adoption by teachers from Italy to Spain and from
Austria to northern France (to rely on the manuscripts that have
survived), can be attributed to his case-law methodology that
reflected legal problems that Gratian and his students would have
encountered when they had visited episcopal tribunals and heard
about various cases.4
When Winroth and Larrainzar established the existence
of different recensions of Gratian’s Decretum in the manuscripts,
scholars immediately realized that they might begin to see how
Gratian’s thought evolved on various subjects. Unfortunately, to
date they have uncovered very little evidence about the
development of Gratian’s thought in any area of law. Winroth
I discuss St. Gall at length in ‘The Biography of Gratian: The Father of
Canon Law’, University of Villanova Law Review 59 (2014) 679-706.
4
Not everyone agrees that Gratian drew upon real life for his examples;
Anders Winroth argued that Gratian’s hypothetical cases were not real court
cases, ‘The Teaching of Law in the Twelfth Century’, Law and Learning in
the Middle Ages: Proceedings of the Second Carlsberg Academy Conference
on Medieval Legal History, 2005, edd. Helle Vogt and Mia MünsterSwendsen (Copenhagen 2006) 41-61 at 47.
3
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has attempted to demonstrate that Gratian changed his opinion
about the primacy of spousal consent in marriage law and about
the validity of the marriage of slaves. 5 In both of these cases the
evidence is not without ambiguity.
While preparing a talk on Gratian’s treatment of the Jews,
I noticed that the canons Gratian included in his Decretum to
establish norms for the legal status of the Jews were not in St.
Gall or in the other pre-vulgate manuscripts. He treated the legal
status of Jews only in his last, vulgate version of the Decretum.6
This fact raises the question why did Gratian become interested
in the Jews ca. 1140, the date of Gratian’s final recension?7 I
have yet to find a convincing explanation. There were notorious
Jewish cases in the mid-twelfth century that might have attracted
Gratian’s notice, but he provided no clues in the dicta around
these canons which events may have captured his attention.
These additional canons are not, however, an example of the
evolution of Gratian’s thought; they are an example of Gratian’s
beginning to have thoughts on an issue rather late in the game.
Gratian introduced his students to the legal status of Jews
in four significant clusters of texts that are not in St. Gall nor in
the pre-vulgate manuscripts. He added them to two distinctions
Anders Winroth, ‘Marital Consent in Gratian’s Decretum’, Readers, Texts
and Compilers in the Earlier Middle Ages: Studies in Medieval Canon Law in
Honour of Linda Fowler-Magerl, ed. Martin Brett and Kathleen G. Cushing
(Farnham, Surrey and Burlington, CT: 2009) 111-121 at 115 n.29 and his
essay ‘Neither Slave nor Free: Theology and Law in Gratian’s Thoughts on
the Definition of Marriage and Unfree Persons’, Medieval Church Law and
the Origins of the Western Legal Tradition: A Tribute to Kenneth Pennington,
edd. Wolfgang P. Müller and Mary E. Sommar (Washington, D.C. 2006)
97-109.
6
They are in the margins or the appendices of Florence, Barcelona, and
Admont. That means the canons came to Gratian’s attention well before he
stopped working on the Decretum, see Eichbauer, ‘From the First to the
Second Recension’ 154, 156, 161, 164.
7
For the evolution of Gratian’s Decretum see Peter Landau, ‘Gratian and the
Decretum Gratiani’, The History of Canon Law in the Classical Period, 11401234: From Gratian to the Decretals of Pope Gregory IX, ed. Wilfried
Hartmann and K. Pennington (History of Medieval Canon Law; Washington,
D.C. 2008) 22-54.
5
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and two causae. In Distinctio 45 canons 3, 4 and 5, Gratian
raised the issue of the validity of coerced conversions of Jews
and more generally how Christian rulers, especially ecclesiastical
authorities, should treat them. Distinctio 54 canons 13, 14, 15
established that Jews cannot have or own Christian servants,
they cannot hold public office, and Jewish slaves who convert to
Christianity are freed. Further along in the Decretum he added
C.17 q.4 c.31 and dicta p.c.30 and p.c.31, in which he repeated
the norm that Jews cannot hold public office. In Causa 2
quaestio 7 canons 24-25, Gratian discussed procedure and noted
that Jews could not bring suit against a Christian in court.
Finally, in his treatise on marriage, Causa 28 quaestio 1 canons
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, he included canons that forbade interreligious
marriages and mandated that Jews who marry Christian women
must convert. Further, Christian children must be removed from
Jewish parents and relatives, and Jewish converts must be
separated from other Jews. Finally, Christians may not marry
Jews under any circumstances. In this essay I will focus on the
problems raised by the coerced conversion of Jews in Distinction
45.
The dictum at the beginning of D.45 is strange: ‘Sequitur
“non percussorem”.’ Friedberg’s footnote explains that this is a
reference to 1 Timothy c.3 verses 2-5, which reads:
Oportet ergo episcopum irreprehensibilem esse, unius uxoris virum,
sobrium prudentem, ornatum, pudicum, hospitalem, doctorem, non
vinolentum, non percussorem, sed modestum, non litigiosum . . .
non neophytum.

A little searching in the Decretum reveals that Gratian cited the
first part of 1 Timothy at the beginning of D.36, and that he dealt
with ‘ornatus et hospitalis’ in D.40 and D.41-D.42, ‘pudicus’ in
D.43, a ‘vinolentus’ and clerical drunkeness in D.44, ‘non
percussorem’ in D.45, ‘non litigiosum’ in D.46,8 and ‘neophyti’
in D.48 as guidelines to episcopal rectitude.9 After D.48 Gratian
abandoned 1 Timothy as a framework for discussing clerical
8

1 Timothy 3.3.
It was quite natural that Gratian would have used 1 Timothy as an outline for
episcopal and clerical rectitude. I discuss Gratian’s use of Timothy in
‘Biography of Gratian’ 696-697.
9
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discipline. In Gratian’s notation at the beginning of D.45 in all
the recensions of Gratian, he seems to have assumed that the
reader would remember from his reference to 1 Timothy in D.36
and, from his using words from 1 Timothy in D.40-44, that ‘non
percussorem’ followed ‘vinolentum’ in the epistle of the PseudoPaul.
The dictum in St. Gall was more helpful as a aidemémoire than the dictum in in the later recensions:10
Neque percussor iuxta eundem (i.e. the author of 1 Timothy) esse
debet. Non enim oportet episcopum irascibilem et animi esse turbati
ubi percutiat quia patiens debet esse et eum sequi qui dorsum posuit
ad flagella.

This more extensive reminder to the reader was necessary there,
perhaps, because St. Gall did not include the texts in D.44 on
drunkeness nor did he include the texts from D.40-41-42-43. St.
Gall did contain D.46. Do these omissions provide evidence that
St. Gall is an abbreviation? I think not. In St. Gall, Gratian was
discussing a particular case. In his later recensions he outlined
the norms for proper clerical behavior using Timothy as a rough
guide.
In St. Gall and the other pre-vulgate manuscripts, the
texts contained in D.45 focused on irascible prelates who abused
their subjects. Although the connection between cantankerous
Christian prelates and Jews is not obvious, Gratian inserted
three canons on the legal status of Jews in his vulgate recension
at D.45. Pope Gregory I’s letter provided the text for c.3, Pope
Gregory IV’s for c.4, and the Fourth Council of Toledo (A.D.
633) canon 57 was the final addition. Pope Gregory I’s letter
reminded Pascasius, the bishop of Naples, that the Jews of
Naples should not be prevented from celebrating their festivities.
Pope Gregory IV’s letter emphasized that prelates should not
correct their subjects harshly, including, he stated, the
‘presumption of the Jews’.
The most important text in D.45 was the canon from the
Council of Toledo that stipulated that that Jews should not be
coerced to accept the Christian faith, but if they became
Christians, they should be compelled to remain Christian. This
10

St. Gall, Stiftsbibliothek 673 p.13a.
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canon circulated widely in pre-Gratian canonical collections.
Twenty-two extant collections contain it. Uncharacteristically,
Gratian resolved the question without creating any distinctions.
His reading of the conciliar canon was brutally simple: ‘Jews
should not be forced to convert to the faith, but if they were
unwillingly converted, they must remain Christian’.11 In short, if
a Jew was baptized, he became a Christian. What if the baptism
was coerced? All the later jurists talked about the forced
conversion of Jews when they glossed D.45. Gratian’s successors
developed a flexible doctrine. They created a distinction
between conditional and absolute coercion, which was
determined by the Roman law principles but not by the language
of Roman law.12 They concluded that a forced conversion or
baptism of a Jew was valid if bestowed under only moderate
terror.
The text of the conciliar canon was not precise on what
ceremony or step constituted a valid conversion. It did state that
if Jews had been forcibly converted and received the major
sacraments, they could be coerced to remain Christians (D.45
c.5):
De Iudeis autem precepit sancta sinodus, nemini deinceps uim ad
credendum inferre. ‘Cui enim uult Deus miseretur, et quem uult
indurat ‘. Non enim tales inviti salvandi sunt, sed volentes, ut integra
sit forma iustitie. Sicut enim homo propria arbitrii voluntate serpenti
obediens periit, sic vocante se gratia Dei proprie mentis conversione
quisque credendo salvatur. Ergo non vi, sed libera arbitrii facultate
ut convertantur suadendi sunt, non potius inpellendi. Qui autem
iampridem ad Christianitatem coacti sunt, sicut factum est
temporibus religiosissimi principis Sisebuti, quia iam constat eos
sacramentis diuinis associatos, et baptismi gratiam suscepisse, et
11

D.45 c.5; Gratian concluded in his dictum after c.4 that this conciliar canon
meant that ‘Iudei non sunt cogendi ad fidem, quam tamen si inviti susceperint,
cogendi sunt retinere’. On the Jews in canon law see Walter Pakter, Medieval
Canon Law and the Jews (Abhandlungen zur rechtwissenschaftlichen
Grundlagenforschung 68; Ebelsbach 1988).
12
For a detailed discussion of when fear invalidated an action, see Stephan
Kuttner, Kanonistische Schuldlehre von Gratian bis auf die Dekretalen
Gregors IX: Systematisch auf Grund der handschriftlichen Quellen
dargestellt. (Studi e Testi 64; Città del Vaticano 1935, reprinted 1961) 299314.
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crismate unctos esse, et corporis Domini extitisse participes, oportet,
ut fidem, quam vi vel necessitate susceperint, tenere cogantur, ne
nomen Domini blasphemetur, et fides, quam susceperunt, vilis ac
contemptibilis, habeatur. (This holy synod commands that Jews not
be forced to believe. Rather, God has mercy on those he chooses and
punishes others he does not (Rom. 9:18). The unwilling must not be
saved but only the willing, as an example of a complete model of
justice. As man perished by willingly obeying the serpent, he is saved
through the grace of God by believing. Therefore the Jews are not to
be converted by force but by persuasion and through their free will.
Those who have already been forced to convert to Christianity, as
had occurred during the time of the most pious ruler Sisebut, since
they have accepted the divine sacraments, received the grace of
baptism, the anointed with holy oil, and taken the body of the Lord,
they must remain in the faith that they received whether by force or
by necessity so that the name of the Lord and the faith they hold not
be considered vile and contemptible.)

Must a Jew have received all the appropriate sacraments to
become a Christian? Christian thinkers had very early on
concluded that a valid baptism was the key to becoming a
Christian.13 An anonymous glossator commented on the words
‘willing, as an example of a complete model of justice,’ ‘Namely
to come to the sacrament of baptism’.14 From the early twelfth
century on, baptism became the liturgical act and the sacrament
that defined a Christian from a non-Christian and established
‘citizenship’ within the Christian church.
The most important canonist of the twelfth century,
Huguccio established the jurisprudential ground rules for
defining what constituted a forced valid conversion or baptism.
In a gloss to the Toledo conciliar canon, Huguccio explored what
constituted consent of a Jew to baptism. Rufinus had already
defined coercion as either absolute or conditional when he
Jean Gaudemet, ‘“Baptisumus, ianua sacramentorum” CJC, c. 849:
Baptême et droits de l’homme’, Rituels: Mélanges offerts au R.P. PierreMarie Gy, edd. P. d Clerck and E. Palazzo (Paris 1990) 273-282, reprinted in
La doctrine canonique médiévale (Collected Studies; Aldershot-Brookfield
1994).
14
Köln, Erzbischöfliche Diözesan- und Dombibliothek 127, fol. 43v
interlinear gloss to D.45 c.5 s.v. volentes: ‘scilicet ad sacramentum salutis
uenire’.
13
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discussed the validity of oaths. 15
terminology to coerced baptisms:16

Huguccio applied the

I distinguish between absolute and conditional coercion: If anyone is
baptized by absolute coercion, for example if one person tied him
down and another poured water over him, unless he consents
afterwards, he ought not to be forced to embrace the Christian faith.

Because he believed that baptism was valid whether willing or
unwilling, awake or sleeping, he concluded posterior consent
made a Jew a Christian.17 Not all later jurists accepted
Huguccio’s reasoning. They held that invalid acts could never
been validated by later consent.
For example, invalid
confessions extracted by torture were never valid ex post
factum.18 Huguccio specified in some detail exactly what
constituted conditional coercion:19
If someone is baptized under conditional coercion, for example if I
say I will beat, rob, kill, or injure you, unless you are baptized, he can
be forced to hold the faith, because from conditional coercion an
unwilling person is made into a willing person, and as a willing
person is baptized. A coerced choice is a choice, and makes consent.

15
Rufinus, Summa decretorum to C.22 q.5 c.1 s.v. Qui compulus, ed. Heinrich
Singer (Paderborn 1902, reprinted Aalen 1963) 399-402.
16
Huguccio, Summa to D. 45 c.5 s.v. associatos unctos corporis Domini,
Lons-le-Saunier, Archives départementales du Jura 16, fol. 61v, Admont,
Stiftsbibliothek 7, fol. 61v, Vat. lat. 2280, fol. 44r: ‘De coactione autem
distinquo, aut est absoluta aut est conditionalis. Si absoluta coactione quis
baptizetur, puta unus tenet eum ligatum et alius superfundit aquam, nisi (ubi
Lons-le-Saunier) postea consentiat, non debet cogi ad fidem Christianam
tenendam’. Condorelli, Libertà 55-56 prints this text from Franz Gillmann,
Die Notwendigkeit der Intention auf Seiten des Spenders und des Empfängers
der Sakramente nach der Anschauung der Frühscholastik (Mainz 1916) 16.
17
Ibid.: ‘quia sive volens sive nolens, vigilans sive dormiens quis baptizetur in
forma ecclesie sacramentum accipit’.
18
See my essay ‘Torture and Fear: Enemies of Justice’, RIDC 19 (2008)
203-242.
19
Huguccio, Summa to D. 45 c.5 s.v. associatos unctos corporis Domini,
Lons-le-Saunier, Archives départementales du Jura 16, fol. 61v, Admont,
Stiftsbibliothek 7, fol. 61v, Vat. lat. 2280, fol. 44r: ‘Si vero coactione
conditionali quis baptizetur, puta: te verberabo vel spoliabo bel interficiam vel
leda, nisi baptizeris, debet cogi ut fiedm teneat, quia per talem coactionem de
nolente efficitur quid volens, et volens baptizatur. Voluntas enim coacta
voluntas est et volentem facit, ut xv. q.i. Merito (C.15 q.1 c.1)’.
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Thirteenth-century jurists found Huguccio’s definitions of
conditional coercion persuasive. Raymond of Peñafort (ca.
1234) accepted conditional coercion conferred a valid baptism
but did not accept Huguccio’s conviction that absolute coercion
could confer a valid sacrament. Pope Innocent III had issued the
decretal Maiores in which almost the entire last part of De Iudeis
was quoted. The pope declared that if a Jew had adamantly and
steadfastly refused to accept baptism, the sacrament and the
conversion were not valid.20 Innocent’s decretal was the last
piece of papal canonical jurisdiction that directly touched upon
the issue of coerced baptisms.
Maiores and De Iudeis left many questions open. A
significant issue was the fate of Jewish children in families in
which one of the parents became Christian or in which the
parents did not convert, but in which a child had been baptized.
A case decided in 1229 at the papal curia about the status of a
Jewish child became a bench mark for deciding the rights of the
father, mother and child for centuries. Raymond de Peñafort
included the appellate decision in the Decretales of Gregory IX.21
A Jew in Strasbourg had converted to Christianity and left a
staunchly Jewish wife and four year old son behind. He had
petitioned the bishop to grant him custody of his son. He wanted
to baptize him and raise him as a Christian. The man made only
one argument, at least only one argument was reported in the
decision: his son should be given to him immediately to be raised
a Catholic. Remarkably, the mother appeared before an episcopal synod which heard the case. She presented arguments that
still resonate with maternal love. The boy was young. He
needed the consolation of his mother more than his father. His
gestation had been difficult, his birth painful, and his post partum
strenuous. From these facts the court should understand that the
legitimate conjoining of a man and a woman is called
Summa de penitentia (Rome 1603) 33: ‘quia corporaliter cum violentia
traherentur et super infunderetur aqua, non conferretur character baptismi,
extra de bapt. et eius effectu, Maiores, circa finem (3 Comp. 3.34.1 = X
3.42.3)’.
21
X 3.33.2.
20
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matrimony, not patrimony. A mother’s rights should not be
abrogated to appease a paternalistic jurisprudence. It was a
strikingly clever argument that the jurists pondered for centuries
afterwards. Her last argument was especially touching. The
bishop had custody of the boy during the hearing, but his mother
pleaded that the boy should remain with her since her husband
had only recently converted. Failing that solution, neutral custodians should take care of the boy until he reached majority. 22
This mother’s plea did not move the court.
After the mid-thirteenth century, the jurists used a new
genre of literature, the consilium, to expand their discussion of
the legal status of converted Jews and their children.23 Two of
the earliest consilia I know that deal with the legal status of Jews
date from the second half of the thirteenth century. They treated
the baptism of Jewish children and much more. A Dominican
inquisitor, Florio da Vicenza, was particularly interested in
relapsed baptized Jews who had ‘Judaized’.24 A similar problem
was posed by Jews who persecuted other Jews who had
converted to Christianity. The inquisitor’s zeal led him into
X 3.33.2: ‘Ad quod illa respondit, quod, cum puer adhuc infans exsistat,
propter quod magis materno indiget solatio quam paterno, sibique ante partum
onerosus, dolorosus in partu, [ac] post partum laboriosus fuisse noscatur, ac
ex hoc legitima coniunctio maris et feminae magis matrimonium quam
patrimonium nuncupetur, dictus puer apud eam debet convenientius remanere,
[quam apud patrem ad fidem Christianam de novo perductum transire
debebat, aut saltem neutrius sequi, priusquam ad legitimam aetatem
perveniat. Hinc inde multis aliis allegatis: tu autem praedicto puero medio
tempore in tua potestate retento, quid tibi faciendum sit in hoc casu nos
consulere voluisti (pars decisa in the Decretales).]’.
23
Mario Ascheri has devoted a lifetime of scholarship to the medieval and
early modern consilia, e.g ‘“Consilium sapientis”, perizia medica e “res
iudicata”: Diritto dei “dottori” e istituzioni comunali’, Proceedings Berkeley
1980 532-579 and ‘Legal Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition’, Legal
Consulting in the Civil Law Tradition, edd. Mario Ascheri, Ingrid
Baumgärtner, and Julius Kirshner (Studies in Comparative Legal History;
Berkeley 1999) 11-53.
24
Riccardo Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali per l’inquisizione medievale
(1235-1330) (Bologna 2011) 121-122; Bolognese jurists repeated much of the
consilium in their own that Parmeggiani prints on pp. 126-128. The jurists
debated this question in consilia until the early modern period.
22
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uncharted legal territory. A number of jurists from Padua or
possibly Bologna responded to his questions about several cases
on his docket that involved Jews. The questions posed by
Brother Florio indicate that Jews were only recently coming to
the attention of inquisitors and also reveal how little help the
normative texts in the canonical collections were in solving more
intricate problems. The jurists dealt with eight questions that
Florio must have asked them to answer. The first was whether
relapsed Jews should have the legal status of heretics and be
subject to the inquisitor’s court. The answer was simply yes,
without any explanation of their reasoning.25
The second question was more ominous and threatening
to the Jewish communities. Could Jews who aided and abetted
relapsed Jews be tried in inquisitorial courts as ‘supporters,
receivers, and defenders of heretics?’26 The jurists said yes.
They also provided insight into their reasoning: the Jews held
their legal rights in Christian society only as a privilege, not as a
right. The jurists concluded by citing legal maxim that had long
been embedded in canonical jurisprudence: those that abused
their privileges lost them.27
The next two questions involved procedure. When and
how could Jews be tortured?
If the proofs contained
‘presumptiones violentae’, that is evidence that fell just short of
complete proof, Jews could be tortured. This standard was
common in the procedural literature of the Ius commune for

25

Ibid. 124.
Ibid: ‘dicunt eum posse et debere procedere contra eos sicut contra fautores,
receptores et defensores hereticorum’. This language was taken from
decretals and secular legislation; see my ‘Pro peccatis patrum puniri: A Moral
and Legal Problem of the Inquisition’, Church History 47 (1978) 137-154,
reprinted with additions in Popes, Canonists and Texts, 1150-1550 (Aldershot
1993) XI pp. 3-16, especially at 11-12.
27
Ibid. 124: ‘Licet Iudei ab ecclesia in suis ritibus tollerentur, tamen ratione
delicti quod in ecclesiam committunt, sunt severitate ecclesiastica
coherecendi. Et privilegium meretur amittere qui permissa sibi abutitur
potestate’. See D.74 c.6 and C.11 q.3 c.63 for the earliest appearance of this
maxim in canon law. It did not have its roots in Roman law.
26
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determining whether a person could be tortured.28 It is striking
that the jurists applied the same principles to Jews as they did to
Christians. They also concluded that Jews could not be tortured
in ways that would draw blood.29 This limitation seems to imply
that the jurists did not consider relapsed Jews to have committed
a crime.
The other points in the ‘consilium’ covered Jews who
used their synagogues to wash away baptisms of Christians or in
which they circumcised Christians. These synagogues should be
destroyed.30 The seventh question in the ‘consilium’ was what
should be done with a Jewish child of a baptized Jew (i.e.
Christian), who was away or in regions unknown. Could the
child remain with Jewish mother? The jurists did not hesitate to
take the child away from his mother on the grounds of the ‘favor
fidei’. It had become the common opinion of the jurists,
following the precedent of Pope Gregory IX’s decretal (X 3.33.2)
(discussed above) that a Jewish child of a mixed marriage should
live with the Christian parent.31 The Church, the local bishop, or
the Christian prince should take the child to be raised by
Christians who were not suspect and who were baptized. They
granted an exception: unless the child had the ‘impediment of a
contrary will (obex contrariae voluntatis)’.
This strange
terminology dates back to a similar phrase of Saint Augustine
and had been employed by Pope Innocent III, theologians and
canonists to evaluate the intentions of those who received

Pennington, ‘Torture and Fear: Enemies of Justice’, RIDC 19 (2008) 203242.
29
Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali 124: ‘potest et debet eam extorquere
suppliciis citra effusionemm sanguinis per executorem vel iudicem
secularem’.
30
Ora Limor, ‘Christians and Jews’, The Cambridge History of Christianity,
4: Christianity in Western Europe c. 1100-1500, edd. Miri Rubin and Walter
Simons (Cambridge 2009) 494-556, with bibliography; also R. Po-Chia Hsia,
The Myth of Ritual Murder: Jew and Magic in Reformation Germany (New
Haven 1988).
31
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baptism in order to judge whether the baptism was validly
bestowed.32
Pope Nichaolas III declared in a letter dated 1277 that
Jews who converted under threats of death cannot return to
Jewish practices because they were not ‘absolutely and exactly
coerced (absolute seu precise coacti)’. Gradually the ‘praecisa
coactio’ replaced ‘absoluta coactio’ in the terminology of the
jurists.33 Pope Boniface VIII used that terminology in his
decretal letter Contra Christianos that was later included in his
Liber Sextus. The pope also confirmed the opinions of the jurist
who advised Florio da Vicenza that relapsed Jews were to be
equated with heretics and that any Jews who aided or abetted
those Jews who had apostatized were subject to the jurisdiction
of Christian courts and could be punished with the same penalties
as those imposed upon relapsed Jews.34
Gratian inclusion of the Fourth Council of Toledo’s fiftyseventh canon on Jews shaped the legal discussion of the legal
status of baptized Jews for centuries. One puzzle must remain
unresolved: why did Gratian not include canons on Jews in
earlier recensions? An easy answer that I do not find convincing
is that from the First Crusade on, Jews became a legal problem in
the Latin West. Gratian was well aware that the major preGratian canonical collections, which were all divided into books
and titles, often had sections devoted to the Jews.35 Jews had
Parmeggiani, I consilia procedurali 125: ‘parvulus filius Iudei baptizati
existens apud matrem que remansit in Iudaica cecitate patre absente in remotis
partibus et ignotis, favore fidei est accipeindus ab eo per ecclesiam vel loci
ordinarium seu principem Christianum, cuius subest dominio; et nutriendus
apud fideles non suspectos et baptizandus, nisi obex in eo contrarie
voluntatis’. On the phrase ‘obex contrariae voluntatis’ and issue of forced
baptism, see Mario Condorelli, I fondamenti giuridici della tolleranza
religiosa nell'elaborazione canonistica dei secoli XII-XIX: Contributo storicodogmatico (2nd. ed. Università di Catania Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di
Giurisprudenza 36; Milano 1960) 88-105.
33
‘Praecisa coactio’ is not a term of Roman law; the Roman jurists did use
‘praecise’ in several different contexts’, e.g. Dig. 36.3.1.20.
34
VI 5.2.13.
35
E.g. Burchard of Worms, Decretum 4.81-88, Collection in Three Books 3.6,
Polycarpus, Collectio canonum 7.13 and many others.
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always presented legal problems. There were many earlier texts
in canonical collections that treated Jews. Gratian knew them. It
is possible that the idea slowly dawned on Gratian that he should
consider Jews, perhaps for a number of different reasons. Unlike
all earlier collections Gratian did not divide his collection into
books and titles. None of Gratin’s distinctiones and causae dealt
with Jews in Christian society. When he decided to include
canons on Jews, the structure of the Decretum limited the places
where he could place Jewish material. Consequently, all the
canons he included treating the legal status of Jews were
awkwardly placed in causae that dealt with other issues. Perhaps
that is a metaphor for the status of Jews and other non-Christians
in medieval Christian society.
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